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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Notice Of Cause Of Arrest
Sharpe v. State'
The defendant was stopped in his car by two police officers and
asked to show his driver's license. He produced the license in a plastic
card-holder, but, using profanity, refused their demand to remove it
from the holder. One officer thereupon told the defendant that he was
under arrest for disorderly conduct. The defendant jumped from his
car and began to walk away. The officer grabbed his coat, a scuffle
1. 231 Md. 401, 190 A.2d 628, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963), habeas corpus
denied, 225 F. Supp. 738 (D. Md. 1964).
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ensued, and defendant was taken into custody. He was charged with
disorderly conduct and assaulting a police officer and was convicted of
both in the Municipal Court of Baltimore City. On appeal to the
Criminal Court of Baltimore, he was tried without a jury and again
found guilty on both counts. On further appeal to the Court of Appeals
he argued that there was no evidence of disorderly conduct on which
the arrest could have been based. Therefore, he contended, the arrest
was illegal, he had the right to resist, and he could not be guilty of
assaulting a police officer, inasmuch as the officer was attempting an
unlawful arrest at the time of the assault.
In affirming the conviction for assault, the Maryland Court of
Appeals, in. a 4-3 decision, recognized that the conviction depended
on the legality of the arrest. Judge Henderson, for the majority, found
that the officers could have properly arrested the defendant for failure
to comply with the request to take the license out of the holder, and
this finding precluded a consideration of the legality of the arrest for
disorderly conduct. The majority felt that the fact that the defendant
was not charged with non-compliance was immaterial.' The court
thereupon held that the arrest was legal and the defendant was not
justified in resisting. The dissenting judges took issue with the
majority's justification of the arrest for non-compliance, contending
that the salient question was the legality of the arrest for disorderly
conduct. The dissenters then went on to find that no evidence of dis-
orderly conduct on the part of the defendant was shown.4 Therefore,
since the officers had no cause to arrest the defendant for disorderly
conduct the arrest was illegal, and the defendant was justified in using
any reasonable means, including force, to resist.
2. The court noted that only the assault conviction was before it, citing MD. CODE
ANN. art. 5, § 12A (Supp. 1962) :
"A defendant in a criminal action may appeal to the Court of Appeals from a
conviction or sentence imposed by the Criminal Court of Baltimore in the proper
exercise of its jurisdiction on appeal from the Municipal Court of Baltimore City
only in the following cases: . . . (2) Where the sentence of the Municipal Court
of Baltimore City was imprisonment only and the sentence of the Criminal Court
of Baltimore on appeal therefrom is imprisonment for a greater term, or imprison-
ment for the same term and a fine; .... " (Emphasis added.)
In the Municipal Court of Baltimore City the defendant was sentenced to thirty
days in jail for disorderly conduct and sixty days for assault, the sentences to run
concurrently. On appeal to the Criminal Court of Baltimore he was again found guilty
on both counts and sentenced to thirty days for the first and six months for the second
offense, to run concurrently. Ibid. Sharpe v. State, p. 402. Since the sentence imposed
for disorderly conduct by the Criminal Court was the same as that imposed by the
Municipal Court, the disorderly conduct conviction could not be reviewed by the
Court of Appeals.
3. The court cited as authority for this proposition Price v. State, 227 Md. 28,
175 A.2d 11 (1961), in which, though the defendant was arrested on suspicion of
burglary, he was indicted on another offense. In citing Price the court confused the
charge made at the time of arrest, on which the arrest should be justified, with the
charge made in the indictment. However, in that case the officers had probable cause
to arrest on suspicion of burglary, and therefore, the arrest on the charge was legal.
After the arrest the burglary charge was dropped and the defendant was indicted on
a different charge. It was indeed proper to hold that the arrest was legal even though
the defendant was not later indicted on the charge made at the time of arrest. This
is not the case in Sharpe.
4. In Maryland the gist of the offense of disorderly conduct is "the doing or
saying, or both, of that which offends, disturbs, incites, or tends to incite, a number
of people gathered in the same area." Drews v. State, 224 Md. 186, 192, 167 A.2d 341,
343 (1961).
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The critical issue in this case, though voiced by neither majority
nor minority, was whether an arrest could be justified on a ground not
assigned at the time of the arrest. Although the arrest was ultimately
justified for failure to remove the license, it appears from the facts
given that the officer intended to arrest only for disorderly conduct,
and the charge of failure to comply probably did not even occur to
him, if indeed he was aware that there was such an offense.' The
defendant was given notice of arrest on a specific charge, and he resisted
the arrest made on that charge. If he resisted in reliance on the specified
charge, the court's holding means that his reliance was unjustified.
Today it is black letter law that an officer arresting without a
warrant must inform the arrestee of (1) his authority to arrest, (2)
his intention to arrest, and (3) the cause for the arrest.6 In states
where the duty has been legislatively imposed,7 the statutes indicate
that notice is required to be given before or at the time of the arrest."
On the other hand several cases have held that notice may follow the
arrest.' Only substantial compliance is demanded,1" and no particular
form of words is required.'1 All that is necessary is that the arrestee
be given such sufficient notice that he has the opportunity to submit
in an orderly and peaceable manner. However, notice is not necessary
where good reason appears for the omission of the notice.' 2 Thus, if
the person arrested knows the reason for his arrest," such as where
5. The court reasoned that under Art. 66%, § 97 of the MD. CODE ANN., the
defendant was required to show his license upon demand of a uniformed officer. The
court further noted that the request that the card be removed from the holder was
not unreasonable, and a refusal to obey a proper order of an officer may constitute
an offense justifying an arrest. The fact that before neither the magistrate, the
criminal court, nor the Court of Appeals was this rationale submitted by the State
suggests the likelihood that the State's best legal officers were unaware of the exist-
ence of such an offense. In fact, the only alternative offered by the State on appeal
to justify the arrest was that the defendant had backed his car from an alley, without
stopping, into the path of the police car, and had thus committed a misdemeanor in
the presence of the officers. The court apparently rejected this argument as lacking
in merit and adopted its own theory. See Brief of Appellee, and Appellant's Motion
for Re-Argument.
6. 1 ALEXANDER, TH4 LAW ov ARREST § 93 (1949) ; 4 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE § 1616 (Anderson ed. 1957) ; 6 C.J.S. Arrest § 6e (1937).
7. See ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCXDUR § 25, comment at 248 (1930), for a
listing of the states and statutes.
8. The AL divides the statutes into several general types. See ALI, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 248. I. "When arresting a person without a warrant, the officer must inform
him of his authority and the cause of the arrest. ... Ibid. I. "The person making
the arrest must inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him, of the
cause of the arrest, and the authority to make it .. " (Emphasis added.) Here, the
wording "to be arrested" indicates that notice must definitely come before the arrest.
9. Bourne v. Richardson, 133 Va. 441, 113 S.E. 893, 899 (1922) ; Commonwealth
v. Cooley, 72 Mass. 350, 356 (1856) ; Hinton v. Sims, 171 Miss. 741, 158 So. 141, 143(1934) ; State v. Malnati, 109 Vt. 429, 199 Atl, 249, 250 (1938) ; State v. Taylor, 70
Vt. 1, 39 At. 447, 449 (1896) ; Ward v. Green, 11 Conn. 455, 459 (1836).
10. People v. Jaurequi, 142 Cal. App. 2d 722, 298 P.2d 896, 901 (1956) ; State v.
Frink, 120 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Iowa 1963); Nickell v. Commonwealth, Ct. App. Ky.,
285 S.W.2d 495 (Ky. 1956).
11. State v. Phillips, 118 Iowa 660, 92 N.W. 876, 883 (1902).
12. Ibid. See also RZSTATEMENT, TORTS § 128 (1934), which states that an officer
must give a notice of cause of arrest unless the arrestee, knowing the arrestor to be
an officer, does not request it, except where the officer reasonably believes it would be
dangerous, would imperil the making of the arrest, or would be useless or unnecessary.
13. Minton v. State, 198 Ark. 875, 131 S.W.2d 948, 950 (1939) ; Dale v. Common-
wealth, 186 Ky. 510, 217 S.W. 363, 364 (1920) ; State v. Swanson, 119 Ore. 522,
250 Pac. 216, 217 (1926).
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he has just admitted the commission of an offense,' 4 is in the process
of committing the offense, or has just committed the offense in the
presence of the officer,15 notice of cause of arrest is not necessary. Nor
is it necessary where there is no reasonable opportunity to give notice, 16
or where it would be impractical or futile,'7 such as where the arrestee
is fleeing,'" or actively resisting.' 9 The existing law thus emphasizes
the right of an arrested person to know the basis for his arrest in order
to determine whether he should submit or whether he may properly
resist. ° Lesser emphasis is placed on the convenience of the arrestor.
The purpose of the requirement of notice of authority and cause is
to protect personal liberty from unlawful interference. 2' A person is
privileged to defend himself with reasonable force, if necessary, to
preserve this liberty.22 However, resistance to an arrest is an act done
at the peril of the arrestee.2' His right is determined in absolutes -
if the arrest is unlawful, his right to resist is established, but if the
arrest is lawful, there is no right to resist whatsoever." Even areasonable belief in the illegality of the arrest is no defense to a charge
14. People v. Rios, 46 Cal. App. 2d 297, 294 P.2d 39, 41 (1956).
15. Minton v. State, 198 Ark. 875, 131 S.W.2d 948, 950 (1939) ; Anderson v.
Foster, 73 Idaho 340, 252 P.2d 199, 202 (1953) ; Heinzman v. State, 45 Okla. Crim. 305,
283 Pac. 264 (1929).
16. Nickell v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Ky. 1956) ; Love v. Bass, 145
Tenn. 522, 238 S.W. 94, 95 (1922).
17. State v. Frink, 120 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Iowa 1963) ; Nickell v. Commonwealth,
supra note 16, at 496.
18. State v. Phillips, 118 Iowa 660, 92 N.W. 876, 884 (1902); Commonwealth v.
Negri, 414 Pa. 21, 198 A.2d 595, 601 (1964); Smith v. Drew, 175 Wash. 11, 26 P.2d
1040, 1044 (1933).
19. State v. Phillips, supra note 18, at 884.
20. Wolf v. State, 19 Ohio St. 248, 259 (1869).
21. Johnson v. State, 19 Ala. App. 141, 95 So. 583, 585 (1923).
22. United States v. Angelet, 231 F.2d 190, 193 (2d Cir. 1956) ; People v. Dreares,
15 App. Div. 2d 204, 221 N.Y.S.2d 819, 821 (1961) ; Roberson v. State, 43 Fla. 156,
29 So. 535, 538 (1901); State v. Robertson, 191 S.C. 509, 5 S.E. 2d 285 (1939);
State v. Robinson, 145 Me. 77, 72 A.2d 260, 262 (1950) ; Sugarman v. State, 173 Md.
52, 57, 195 Atl. 324, 326 (1937). There is, however, a qualification to this right. That
the arrestee was unlawfully arrested does not justify him in taking a life in resisting,
unless in self-defense. State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 Pac. 1071, 1076 (1915) ;
State v. Cates, 97 Mont. 173, 33 P.2d 578, 587 (1934) ; Coats v. State, 101 Ark. 51,
141 S.W. 197, 201 (1911) ; Davis v. State, 53 Okla. Crim. 411, 12 P.2d 555, 557 (1932).
Nor is mere temporary detention such an invasion as to justify doing serious injury,
or use of a deadly weapon, unless in self-defense. State v. Rousseau, 40 Wash. 2d 92,
241 P.2d 447, 449 (1952).
23. Although no cases are found which expressly state this, it is strongly implied
in all the cases, which usually say simply, "The arrest being illegal, the defendant was
justified in resisting." See the instant case at 406. There was no consideration of
whether the defendant resisted because of or in spite of the possible illegality of the
arrest. See also MORELAND, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 41 (1959). "There is no
right to resist a lawful arrest made in a lawful manner. . . . The fact that the arrestee
is mistaken as to either the law or the facts as to the legality of the arrest will not
avail him. It is the policy of the law to protect one who is executing lawful process
in a lawful manner and consequently it is considered unwise to protect one who is
resisting such process, even though his resistance is supported by a reasonable belief
that the service is illegal." In essence this "act at your own peril" theory makes
resistance to a legal arrest a mailum prohibitunt offense, although not of a statutory
origin. See note 41 infra.
24. Smith v. State, 84 Ga. App. 79, 65 S.E.2d 709, 711 (1951).
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of assault arising out of the resistance.25 Under such a rule it is neces-
sary for the arrestee, in deciding whether to resist, to know, at the
minimum, the ground on which the arrest is based.2 6 Since the cause
for the arrest is perhaps the single most important factor in determin-
ing the legality of the arrest, a rule which would permit an arrest to
be made without the necessity of informing the defendant of the cause
would render the right to resist illusory.
In Leachinsky v. Christie,2" which may one day become "one of
the pillars of English liberty"2 the Court of Appeals and House of
Lords wrote well-reasoned and analytical opinions on the requirement
of notice of cause. In an action for false imprisonment the plaintiff
showed that he had been arrested without a warrant by the defendant,
a police officer, on the stated ground of commission of a misdemeanor,
although the officer admitted that the real reason for the arrest was
that he suspected the plaintiff of having committed a felony. 9 The
parties conceded that the misdemeanor charge was unfounded, but
that there were reasonable grounds to have arrested the plaintiff for
25. Love v. State, 15 Okla. Crim. 429, 177 Pac. 387, 388 (1919) ; see also MoRE-
LAND, op. cit. supra note 23, at 41.
26. Under the "resistance-to-arrest-is-a-malun-prohibitum-offense" analogy, re-
sistance to a lawful arrest, under an innocent and non-negligent mistake of fact, will
not be excused even if the mistake was of such a nature that what was done would
have been unpunishable and entirely proper, had the facts been as they were reasonably
supposed to be. See PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 699 (1957). Because of this mistake
of fact doctrine it is essential for the arrestee to know why he is being arrested in
order to determine whether he can properly resist. See also Perkins, The Law of
Arrest, 25 IOWA L. Rzv. 200, 248 (1940).
27. 2 All E.R. 395 (C.A. 1945), aff'd, 1 All E.R. 567 (H.L. 1947).
28. Note, Arrest - Without Warrant, 63 Scot. L. Rv. 205 (1947).
29. The rule in false arrest cases is that a person arresting on one ground, upon
which it subsequently develops it cannot be sustained, cannot, when sued for false
imprisonment, justify on the theory that another ground existed at the time of the
arrest and for which, under the circumstances, the arrest would have been legal, or
because reasonable ground existed for an arrest for such other unassigned offense.
22 Am. Jur. False Imprisonment § 84 (1939); 35 C.J.S. False Imprisonment § 35(1960) ; 64 A.L.R. 653 (1929). The importance of the statement of cause at the time
of arrest, therefore, becomes apparent. The rights of the parties become fixed at
the time of the arrest and are based on the cause assigned at the time of arrest, and
charges based on afterthoughts and facts subsequently ascertained are of no avail
to the person who gives a wrong statement of cause at the time of arrest. Cunningham
v. Baker, 104 Ala. 160, 16 So. 68, 71 (1894); Donovan v. Guy, 347 Mich. 457, 80
N.W.2d 190 (1956) ; McNeff v. Heider, 216 Ore. 583, 337 P.2d 819, 823 (1959);
Noe v. Meadows, 229 Ky. 53, 16 S.W.2d 505, 508, 64 A.L.R. 648 (1929); Snead
v. Bennoil, 166 N.Y. 325, 59 N.E. 899, 900 (1901). In his suit against the arrestor the
plaintiff need go no farther in anticipation of defenses than to negative the ground given
by the defendant as the basis of his arrest of the plaintiff. Hogg v. Lorenz, 234 Ky. 751,
29 S.W.2d 17, 19 (1930). However, an arrest based on more than one ground can
be justified if at least one of those grounds is valid, the other improperly made
charges not in themselves vitiating the arrest. Noe v. Meadows, supra; Hogg v.
Lorenz, supra. The only effect the charge which might have been made, but which
was not made, has in an action for false imprisonment is to mitigate the damages.
Lyons v. Worley, 152 Okla. 57, 4 P.2d 3 (1931) ; Geldon v. Finnegan, 213 Wis. 539,
252 N.W. 369, 373 (1934).
The Maryland court has not yet had occasion to either adopt or reject the rules
governing false imprisonment defenses. Query whether in light of the Sharpe decision
permitting the arrest to be justified on a cause not stated at the time of arrest, Mary-
land would allow the arrestor defending against a false imprisonment charge to justify
the arrest in the same manner as he is permitted to do in the criminal cases - by
bringing forth reasons for the arrest which were not assigned at the time of the arrest?
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the felony. The Court of Appeals held that an arrest could only be
made on a specific ground stated at the time of the arrest.3 0 "The law
does not allow an arrest in vacuo, or without reason assigned", and
the reason assigned must be the self-same reason as is the justification
for the arrest.3' The House of Lords elaborated on the policy con-
sideration behind the law. Placing a high value on the right to resist
an illegal arrest, the House held that such right could not be reconciled
with the proposition that a person can be arrested without knowing
why he is arrested. 2 If the officer has a lawful reason to deprive one
of his liberty he must tell the arrestee what the reason is, for, unless
he be told, he cannot be expected to submit to the arrest or be blamed
for resisting.3 Furthermore, the House stated, the offense charged
must be the offense upon which the arrest was justified. No man could
safely defend his liberty if some other ground for the arrest, which the
officer had not disclosed, could subsequently be brought forward to
justify the arrest.34 This language is echoed in the two leading Ameri-
can cases dealing with notice of cause. 5
Standing diametrically opposed to this law which may become the
"pillar of English liberty", is the Uniform Arrest Act, which was
expected to bring the law of arrest in line with modern day police
practice and needs.36 The Uniform Arrest Act provides that if a lawful
cause for arrest exists the arrest is lawful even though the arresting
officer charges the wrong offense or gives a reason that does not
justify the arrest. 7  This provision of course makes any notice of
cause of arrest given to the arrestee valueless in determining his right
to resist. This problem was avoided by including a provision denying
the citizen the right to resist any arrest made by a uniformed officer.38
30. Leachinsky v. Christie, 2 All E.R. 395, 404 (C.A. 1945).
31. Ibid.
32. Christie v. Leachinsky, 1 All E.R. 567, 575 (H.L. 1947).
33. 1 All E.R. at 578.
34. 1 All E.R. at 560.
35. An officer must arrest for some specified cause and then justify for that cause,
Snead v. Bonnoil, 166 N.Y. 325, 59 N.E. 899 (1901), and if no cause, or insufficient
cause appears the arrestee takes his measures at the time of the arrest, and he must
judge accordingly from the information given. People v. Marendi, 213 N.Y. 600, 107
N.E. 1058, 1060 (1915), citing Howard v. Gosset, L.R., 10 Q.B. 359 (1845).
36. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. Rv. 315 (1942) :
"The law of arrest by peace officers illustrates the discrepancy between law
in the books and the law in action. The former not only antedates the modern
police department, but was developed largely during a period when most arrests
were made by private citizens, when bail for felonies was usually unattainable,
and when years might pass before the royal judges arrived for a jail delivery.
Further, conditions in the English jails were then such that a prisoner had an
excellent chance of dying of disease before trial. Today, with few exceptions,
arrests are made by police officers, not civilians. Typically, they are made without
a warrant by officers in patrol cars, often in response to requests coming over
the police radio, sometimes from distant cities. When a citizen is arrested, his
probable fate is neither bail nor jail, but release after a short detention in a
police station. As a result of the antiquated law on the books, today the great
majority of arrests by police officers are illegal in their inception, continuance, or
termination. This illegality is hardly the fault of the police, for they cannot
fulfill both their duty to obey the law and their duty to protect the community."
37. Id. § 7, at 346.
38. Id. § 5, at 345. "If a person has reasonable ground to believe that he is being
arrested by a police officer, it is his duty to refrain from using force or any weapon
in resisting arrest regardless of whether or not there is a legal basis for the arrest."
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However, it should be noted that the act has been adopted by only
three states.89 Apparently the legislatures are in no hurry to abolish
the right to resist an illegal arrest.
Perhaps the law of arrest is antiquated, unfit for modern use, and
undermines the effectiveness of the police in protecting both the com-
munity and themselves. Perhaps there is also some justification for
abolishing the citizen's right to resist a uniformed officer making an
illegal arrest.4" However the Maryland court has not been concerned
with the problem, at least in a forthright manner. It has continued
unanalytically to recognize the right, while taking a long stride toward
emasculating it by deciding that the legality of the arrest is not neces-
sarily to be determined by the cause stated at the time of arrest. By
what temerity must the arrestee now act to resist an arrest on a charge
of murder, for which he knows there is no probable cause, if the arrest
may be found valid because he actually had negligently and unwittingly
gone fifty-six m.p.h. in a fifty-five m.p.h. zone and in the presence of the
arresting officer ?"' Conceding arguendo that the right to resist may no
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1905 (1953) ; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 594, § 5,
1955; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-10 (1956).
40. See Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. Rv. 315, 330 (1941):
"Though at one time the innocent may have been as likely to resist illegal
arrest as the guilty, this is no longer true. An innocent man will not kill to avoid
a few hours, or at the most several days, in jail. Besides, he will ordinarily have
no gun, and therefore will be unable to resist successfully.
"Thus the right to resist illegal arrest by a peace officer is a right that can
be exercised effectively only by the gun-toting hoodlum or gangster. What he
fears is not an illegal arrest, but a legal one, since a legal arrest is based on
reasonable belief in his guilt and hence likely to result in a prison sentence. There-
fore consciousness of guilt is likely to lead such a person to resist any arrest, and
leave the problem of legality of the arrest to his lawyer only when resistance
is unsuccessful.
"Since the right to resist an illegal arrest by a peace officer can be exercised
only by the enemies of society, it should not exist under modern conditions."
See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2) (a) (1) (Proposed Official Draft), which
proposes that the use of force to resist a known peace officer making an illegal arrest
should not be permitted. "It should be possible to provide adequate remedies against
illegal arrest, without permitting the arrested person to resort to force - a course
of action highly likely to result in greater injury even to himself than the detention."
MODEL PENAL CODE 19, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
41. See for example Squadrito v. Griebsch, 1 N.Y.2d 471, 136 N.E.2d 504 (1956),
a false imprisonment action. The plaintiff was stopped by the defendant, an officer,
for going 70 mph. Asked, "What did I do wrong?", the officer replied, "Just follow
me to the judge." The plaintiff sued for false arrest on the basis of lack of notice of
cause. The court held that the arrest was legal, and notice of cause was not necessary
because the offense was committed in the presence of the officer. The court noted
that both a proper regard for the sensibilities of the public and as a matter of public
relations the arrestee should be advised of the cause of the arrest. However, this was
to be a matter of police administration since the statute did not require notice when
the offense was committed in the presence of the officer. It was a reasonable and
necessary assumption that the offender caught in the act is fully aware of what he is
doing and why he is taken into custody.
However, the numerical growth of the malum prohibitum offenses, (see Sayre,
Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55 (1933)), which are characterized by
the lack of need for mens rea in committing the offense, would seem to increase the
importance of notice of cause of arrest. To be guilty of the offense one need not
know he is committing the offense, and it is predictable that in a large percentage of
the cases the offender is in fact unaware of his offense. In such cases the rule eliminat-
ing the requirement of notice when the offense is committed in the presence of the
officer loses its rationale, since it is based on the supposition of awareness as made
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longer be a healthy or necessary right, query whether the Maryland
Court is approaching its destruction in a fair and direct manner.
In Sharpe the arrest was ultimately justified on the basis of a
misdemeanor committed in the presence of the officer, 42 even though
it appeared that the officer, knowing all the facts, did not know that
those facts actually constituted an offense, and relied on some other
basis for his arrest. It would appear that the court applied the presump-
tion that when one is arrested in the actual commission of an offense
in an officer's presence, the arrest is based on that offense.4" As applied,
this presumption was sufficiently strong to overcome any misleading
statements of the officer to the contrary, and in essence amounted to
an irrebutable presumption that the officer, assuming he was aware of
all the facts, based his arrest on the proper ground. However, actual
reliance on these facts in making the arrest was not necessary. This
rule, which discourages reliance on the statements of officers, and per-
mits them to become less careful in basing their arrest on proper causes,
may show itself to be an insidious encroachment not only on the right
to resist an illegal arrest, but also on the most important concept in
the law of arrest - probable cause.
An officer may arrest without a warrant where there was probable
cause to believe at the time of arrest that a felony has been committed
and the person arrested has committed it.44 Probable cause exists
where the facts within the officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant
a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the offense has been
committed.4 5 Where the offense is committed in the officer's presence,
however, the law does not state the need for probable cause. The defini-
tions of the two are so similar that where "in the presence" is satisfied,
4 6
"probable cause" should also be satisfied. Carrying the Sharpe case
one step further, suppose all the facts of which the officer was conscious
in the Squadrito case. Since in the malum prohibitum offenses it is expected that the
offender will frequently not know that he is committing an offense it should be im-
perative that notice of cause be given. In the eyes of an arrestee who knows of no
wrong which he has committed, an unexplained arrest may be an unjustifiable arrest
and therefore grounds for indignant resistance. It would be in the interests of both
the arrestor and the arrestee to require that notice of cause be given in situations
where there is a strong likelihood that the arrestee does not understand why he is
arrested. Presumptions of knowledge, on which the statutes are based, should be
clearly inapplicable in these situations.
42. An offense takes place in the presence of an officer when his senses afford him
knowledge that an offense is being committed. Stanley v. State, 230 Md. 188, 191,
186 A.2d 478, 480 (1962) ; Allen v. State, 229 Md. 253, 182 A.2d 832 (1962) ; Robin-
son v. State, 200 Md. 128, 78 A.2d 310 (1952); 4 WHARrON, CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURX § 1599 (Anderson ed. 1957) ; 6 C.J.S. Arrest § 5(b) (1937). In the instant
case the officer, although he knew all the facts, apparently did not know that those
facts actually constituted an offense. Since he did not know the offense on which the
court based its decision was being committed, therefore, by definition, it was not
committed in his presence.
43. Rutledge v. Rowland, 161 Ala. 114, 49 So. 461, 466 (1909).
44. Drouin v. State, 222 Md. 271, 278, 160 A.2d 85, 88 (1960) ; Mulcahy v. State,
221 Md. 413, 421, 158 A.2d 80, 85 (1960) ; 6 C.J.S. Arrest § 6(d) (1937).
45. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) ; Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) ; Lane v. State, 226 Md. 81, 92, 172 A.2d 400, 406 (1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 993 (1962); Mulcahy v. State, 221 Md. 413, 422, 158 A.2d
80, 85 (1960).
46. Note 42 supra.
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constituted probable cause for arresting for a felony not committed in
his presence, rather than a misdemeanor committed in his presence.
Suppose also that the officer was not aware that the facts constituted
such probable cause. Under these circumstances he makes the arrest on
some other cause, for which it subsequently proves the arrest was
unjustified. The crucial question becomes: Where facts constituting
probable cause exist, is it necessary for the officer to arrest in reliance
thereon, or is it sufficient to justify the arrest on the ground that such
probable cause existed, not showing that the officer acted upon the
basis of the probable cause?
It would appear that the mere existence of facts constituting
probable cause, without the need for reliance thereon, would frustrate
the real purpose of the requirement of probable cause - the protection
of the citizen from arbitrary arrests. Although reasonableness may be
determined by a hypothetical man, arbitrariness should be determined
in relation to the mind of the arrestor at the time of the arrest.47 If the
court sanctions an arrest, arbitrary in terms of the officer's state of
mind, on the ground that facts constituting probable cause existed, then
the court is in actuality permitting an arbitrary arrest.
However, the courts do not mean that the mere existence of facts
constituting probable cause, without reliance thereon, is sufficient to
make an arrest legal. The legality of the arrest does not depend upon
the actual state of the case in point of fact,4" but upon the honest and
reasonable belief of the arrestor, expressed by his charge,49 in the guilt
of the arrestee, and the belief must be founded upon circumstances
warranting a reasonable man in the belief that the charge made is true.50
An arrest cannot be justified as having been made on probable cause
if the belief is unsupported by the facts,"' and likewise it should not be
justified on the ground that the offense was committed in the officer's
presence, when the officer was not aware of the offense and did not rely
on it to make his arrest. Under this analysis the Sharpe case appears
to have been wrongly decided, since the officer seems to have made his
arrest in reliance on his belief in the cause for which he gave notice at
the time of the arrest, and not in reliance on the fact that the defendant
refused to take his license from the plastic card-holder.
Peter C. Cobb
47. Ware v. Garvey, 139 F. Supp. 71, 85 (D. Mass. 1956).
48. Bacon v. Towne, 4 Mass. 217 (1849) ; Range v. State, 156 S.2d 534, 536 (Fla.
1963) ; State v. Winne, 21 N.J. Super. 180, 91 A.2d 65, 75 (1952), rev. on other
grounds, 96 A.2d 63 (1953).
49. Although in some cases failure to make a charge at the time of arrest does not
invalidate the arrest, such failure may be taken into consideration in determining
probable cause. Stelloh v. Liban, 21 Wis. 2d 119, 124 N.W. 101, 104 (1963).
50. U.S. v. Horton, 86 F. Supp. 92, 96 (W.D. Mich. 1949) ; People v. Hollins,
173 Cal. App. 2d 88, 343 P.2d 174, 176 (1959) ; Van Fleet v. West American Ins. Co.,
5 Cal. App. 2d 125, 42 P.2d 378 (1935) ; People v. Dolgin, 415 Ill. 434, 114 N.E.2d 389,
392 (1953).
51. Pamplin v. State, 21 Okla. Crim. 136, 205 Pac. 521, 523 (1922) ; 6 C.J.S. Arrest§ 6(d) (1) (1937).
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